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NOTES
INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT
[Editor's Note: This article is an adaptation from a Moot Court brief
argued before the Louisiana Supreme Court, urging the proposition
that Louisiana adopt the tort of inducing breach of contract.]
The great weight of authority in civil law' and common
law2 jurisdictions is that a contracting party has a remedy in
tort against one who has induced a breach of that contract.
Therefore, if A has a legal contract with B, and a third party
C, having knowledge of this contract, intentionally and with-
out legal justification induces B to breach his contract with A,
A will have a remedy against C for damages or an injunction.8
At present, Louisiana does not recognize such a cause of action.
The purpose of this Note is to examine why this position is
maintained and to advocate Louisiana's acceptance of the tort
of inducing breach of contract.
Liability for interference with contractual relations has de-
veloped in response to changing economic and social conditions.4
Prior to the twentieth century, economic wealth was in land
and labor. The law which had traditionally protected land and
the master-servant relationship extended its protection in 1853
to personal services contracts in the famous English case of
Lumley v. Gye.5 In the twentieth century the great development
in industry and trade resulted in business relations replacing
land as the major source of economic wealth. Under laissez-faire
economics, this new wealth was not afforded the protection
given to the traditional forms of wealth, as it was theorized
that freedom of action would yield maximum economic bene-
fit. The absence of governmental or legal restraint, however, led
to economic conflict and injustice' It became apparent that legal
protection had to be afforded business relations. Responding to
this need, almost all common law and civil law jurisdictions
began in the 1900's to secure contractual relations from unjusti-
1. 2 H. PINNER, WORLD OF UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 450-54 (1965).
2. Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952).
3. Campbell v. Gates, 236 N.Y. 457, 460, 141 N.E. 914 915 (1923).
4. "Desiring now to follow the majority view, we now embrace generally
the conclusion of the majority opinion in Lumley v. Gye . . . And our change
of view has been brought about by our present belief that rights of the par-
ties to an existing contract are of such importance in the business world
that such rights should be protected from intentional and unjustifiable
interference by a third person." Downey v. United Weather-Proofing, Inc.,
363 Mo. 852, 859, 253 S.W.2d 976, 981 (1953). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 950 (3d ed. 1964).
5. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
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fled outside interference.6 It was during this transitional period,
when the amount of protection afforded contractual relations
was unsettled, that the Louisiana Supreme Court decided to
give only limited protection to contracts.7
In other states the tort has developed a procedural frame-
work similar to that of defamation. Initially the burden is on
the plaintiff to show intentional interference with contract. This
establishes the prima facie tort. The burden then shifts to de-
fendant to show justification or privilege for his conduct. There
are five requisite elements in establishing the prima facie tort:
(1) existence of a legal contract, (2) knowledge of the contract
by defendant at the time of interference, (3) intention to inter-
fere, (4) conduct amounting to an inducement, and (5) conduct
causing the breach. 8 In determining what conduct amounted to
an actionable inducement, early common law decisions9 made
a distinction between lawful and unlawful means. These early
decisions required that defendant's conduct amount to violence,
fraud, deceit, or actual ill will in order to be actionable. How-
ever, it became evident that contractual relations needed pro-
tection from any unjustifiable persuasion. For this reason, all
that is required in American jurisdictions today is intentional
but unjustifiable interference.
Louisiana Jurisprudence
American courts, making no distinction between lawful and
unlawful means of inducement, have almost unanimously pro-
tected contractual relations from unjustifiable interference. Lou-
isiana, however, has limited recovery to interferences where the
means are in themselves unlawful as in cases of deceitful, fraud-
ulent, or malicious conduct. Contrary to the majority American
position, emphasis seems to be placed on deterring the unlawful
means rather than protecting the contractual relationship itself
from outside interference.
In all cases involving inducing breach of contract in Lou-
isiana prior to 1900, the defendant was motivated solely by ill
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 954 (3d ed. 1964).
7. Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902).
8. W PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 950, 954 (3d ed. 1964);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. draft) § 766 (1) (d), (i), (j), (k), (o)
1968.
9. Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 P. 492 (1893); McCann v. Wolff, 28
Mo. App. 447 (1888).
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will towards the plaintiff or used unlawful means of induce-
ment.10 But in 1902 the Louisiana Supreme Court was confronted
with a factual situation in which the defendant's conduct was
limited to lawful means (defendant without the use of fraudu-
lent or malicious means persuaded a person to breach his con-
tract). This case, Kline v. Eubanks," has been cited extensively
as authority for the present Louisiana position that inducing
breach of contract is not actionable unless tortious means in
themselves are used to induce the breach. The court held that
the defendant's conduct was not actionable under Louisiana Civil
Code art. 231512 for the following reasons: (1) The person who
breached the contract with the plaintiff was the proximate cause
and the inducer-defendant's conduct was only a remote cause:
(2) Any remedy in this area would have to be based on legisla-
tive enactment-Justice Breaux's opinion indicated that article
2315 is limited to torts known at the inception of the article;
and (3) The common law jurisdictions did not recognize a cause
of action in such situations.' 3
At the time of the decision in Kline v. Eubanks, the tort of
inducing breach of contract was in its formative stages in most
jurisdictions. Therefore, the rationale of the supreme court in
1902 should be re-examined in light of the relatively rapid de-
velopment that the tort has undergone in the last seventy years.
The inducer's conduct usually can be established as one of
the causes of the plaintiff's injury, but there remains the addi-
tional question of proximate cause-whether the inducer should
be held legally responsible for this injury. Although many for-
10. Graham v. St. Charles R.R., 47 La. Ann. 214, 16 So. 806 (1895) (de-
fendant's coercion of his employees not to patronize plaintiff's store); Dick-
son v. Dickson, 33 La. Ann. 1261 (1881) (threatening plaintiff's laborers to
abandon their employment contracts); Irish v. Wright, 8 Rob. 428 (La. 1844)
(removal of plaintiff's slaves from the state in order to defeat attachment).
11. 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902). The plaintiff contracted with a laborer,
leasing to him a place to live in return for a proportion of the laborer's
crop. The plaintiff, relying on the contract, made improvements on the land
which he would not have otherwise made. The defendant, with knowledge
of the contract, enticed the laborer away from the plaintiff's plantation.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages suffered from the useless im-
provements and losses from the unproductive land. The court held that the
defendant's conduct was not actionable under Civil Code article 2315.
12. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315: "Every act whatever of man that causes dam-
age to another obliges him whose fault it happened to repair it."
13. The court as authority for the American position cited cases in Mary-
land, Kentucky, Missouri, California, and T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF TORTS (2d ed. 1888). Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902). See
notes 21-24, infra.
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mulas have been employed to define "proximate cause,"'1 4 the
real issue involved is a weighing of policy considerations which
determine if defendant should be liable for the consequences of
his conduct.
In the tort of inducing breach of contract the primary policy
consideration is defendant's interest in freedom of action versus
the plaintiff's interest in security of his contract. When the
requisite elements of the tort (knowledge of the contract, in-
tentional conduct amounting to inducement, and conduct a
"cause-in-fact" of the breach) are present, the interest of the
plaintiff should override that of the defendant. In such cases the
conduct of the defendant should be considered the proximate
cause of the injury.15
No legislative enactment should be needed to make induc-
ing breach of contract actionable in Louisiana. Justice Breaux's
opinion is an undue limitation on an article designed as a prin-
ciple of law to be interpreted in light of changing times and
social patterns. 6 If article 2315 is limited to torts known at the
time of the adoption of the article, Louisiana would have been
unable to introduce into its law other modern tort doctrines
such as intentional infliction of emotional distress. 7 Article 2315
provides for a concept of fault which cannot be fixed to nine-
teenth century standards of conduct. This article viewed in
context with the equitable principles of article 21,'8 should make
legislative enactment unnecessary.
14. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 285 (3d ed. 1964).
15. "Some of the earlier decisions denying liability argued that defen-
dant's conduct can never be a proximate cause of the breach, since there
is an intervening voluntary act of the third party promisor; but where that
act is intentionally brought about by the defendant's inducement, or is even
a part of the foreseeable risk which he has created, it seems clear that the
result is well within the limits of 'proximate.'" W. PROSSHR, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 959 (3d ed. 1964).
16. "[E]qually, if not more disappointing is the opinion of Breaux in
the case of Kline v. Eubanks, when he apparently limits the effects of Art.
2315 to problems which were known to the drafters of the Code at the time
when the Code was drafted, and so would limit its general character as a
principle." Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REV. 489, 512 (1942).
17. At the inception of article 2315, the law did not generally allow re-
covery for intentional invasion of a person's interest in peace of mind. If
damages for emotional distress were allowed, they were usually an added
element to recovery of the physical damages sustained by the plaintiff.
In Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920) (pot of gold case), the
court held that infliction of emotional distress independent of any physical
contact was a tort under article 2315.
18. Although article 2315 provides a principle of law as guidance, there
is no express law on inducing breach of contract. Article 21 provides that
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The supreme court in Kline gave great weight to the fact
that other American jurisdictions at that time did not recognize
a cause of action for inducing breach of contract. The court
relied on the 1902 status of the tort in four jurisdictions. But
each of these jurisdictions-Maryland, 19 Missouri,20 Kentucky 21
and California 2 2-have subsequently reversed or modified their
position. An earlier California case,23 taking a position similar to
Kline, required that unlawful means be used before the induce-
ment is actionable. But in 1941 the California Supreme Court
removed this limitation, and even lawful means of inducement
became actionable. 24 The court held that a competitor cannot
justify inducing a breach of contract merely because he is seek-
ing to further his own economic advantage at the expense of
the plaintiff. Justice Traynor noted:
"Whatever interest society has in encouraging free and
open competition by means not in themselves unlawful,
contractual stability is generally accepted as of greater im-
portance than competitive freedom. ' 25
where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed according to
equity. Between a plaintiff who has suffered damages because of a broken
contract and a defendant whose inducement has caused this breach, an
equitable result is reached if such a defendant is subjected to liability.
19. Kimball v. Harman, 34 Md. 407, 6 Am. Rep. 340 (1871), was cited
in Kline for the proposition that the inducer was not the proximate cause.
The Maryland courts have subsequently held that a competitor is not justi-
fied in inducing a breach and that such conduct can be proximate cause of
the damages. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, 120 Md. 381, 87 A. 927
(1913), afj'd 237 U.S. 447 (1915).
20. McCann v. Wolff, 28 Mo. App. 447 (1888), was cited in Kline for the
proposition that inducing breach of contract is not actionable in the absence
of actual malice or fraud. The Missouri Supreme Court expressly overruled
this requirement in 1953. "The term 'maliciously' in this connection alludes
to malice in its technical legal sense, that is, the intentional doing of a
harmful act without justification or excuse, and does not necessarily include
actual malice, that is, malice in the sense of spite or ill will." Downey v.
United Weather-Proofing, Inc., 363 Mo. 852, 858, 253 S.W.2d 976, 980 (1953).
21. Boulier v. MaCauley, 15 S.W. 60, 34 Am. St. Rep. 171 (1891) was also
cited in Kline. W. PROSSER HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 954 n.64 (3d ed.
1964) cites Louisiana and "apparently" Kentucky as the only jurisdictions
which still require unlawful means in themselves be used. Although there
is still some confusion as to the tort's status in Kentucky, It seems their
position has been modified by H. Friedberg, Inc. v. McClary, 173 Ky. 579,
191 S.W. 300 (1917). In this case injunctive relief was allowed against a third
party inducer.
22. Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 P. 492 (1893), was noted by the court
in Kline. But the California position has been changed by Imperial Ice Co.
v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
23. Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 P. 492 (1893).
24. Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
25. Id. at 36, 112 P.2d at 633.
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A survey of subsequent Louisiana Supreme Court decisions
in this area indicate that Kline is the major foundation for the
Louisiana position. In 1904 the court (citing Kline and Cooley
on Torts 2d ed.) denied recovery for inducing breach of contract
in B. J. Wolf & Sons v. New Orleans Tailor Made Pants.26 Great
reliance was given to the fact that Kline was in line with the
great weight of authority in the United States.
27
In Moulin v. Monteleone 2 a husband was denied recovery in
an action against a third party for alienation of his wife's affec-
tion. The court reasoned than since marriage is a civil contract,29
Kline's denial of an action for inducing breach of contract should
apply to the marriage contract; therefore no cause of action
exists for alienation of affections.
The fear of overturning the Moulin case gave great impetus
to continuing the Kline doctrine. But the tort of alienation of
affections should not be equated with the tort of inducing breach
of contract. The court in Moulin admitted that marriage is a
unique contract.3 0 The husband cannot recover damages against
his spouse, whereas damages are allowed against a party who
defaults on his contract. In alienation cases there is also a prob-
lem of determining the amount of recovery to be given the in-
jured spouse. When dealing with emotional damages, courts
hesitate to speculate as to the amount of monetary damages in-
flicted on the injured. Because of the uniqueness of the marriage
contract and because of the other grounds upon which Moulin
rests, it seems that a reversal of Louisiana position on inducing
breach of contract would not lead to an automatic cause of
action for alienation of affections.
26. 113 La. 587, 37 So. 2 (1904). Under the factual situation in this case
recovery would have been very doubtful even at common law because of
the absence of the requisite elements of knowledge of the contract and
affirmative conduct amounting to inducement.
27. Id. at 395, 37 So. at 5: "Our ruling in Kline v. Eubanks is in accord
with the weight of jurisprudence in this country .... .
28. 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927). The decision was based on several
grounds: (1) recovery would amount to payment of punitive damages-
contrary to Louisiana policy; (2) loss of affection of a human being is not a
property right; (3) the alienation is a criminal matter because it involves
a public wrong causing private injury; and (4) the wife and defendant could
not be answerable in solido for damages to the husband.
29. LA. CIV. CODs art. 86: "The law considers marriage in no other view
than as a civil contract."
30. "It is true that marriage is something more than an ordinary con-
tract in which the parties alone are concerned, for it is a status in which
society itself is concerned." Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 175, 175 So.
447, 450 (1927).
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In the 1939 case of Hartman v. Green8 ' the Louisiana court
denied recovery for inducing breach of contract in an action
brought under article 2324.82 The supreme court-again citing
Kline and Cooley on Torts-held that a breach of contract is
not an unlawful act; therefore one who encourages such a breach
is not liable. Recently Louisiana courts have been citing Cust
v. Item 33 as authority for the present position. But this 1942
decision contains no new rationale justifying this unique position.
The Cust decision merely cited Cooley on Torts, Kline, and all
subsequent supreme court decisions which in turn rely on Kline.
Cooley was originally cited by Kline to indicate that Louisiana
was in line with her sister jurisdictions. But the supreme court's
continual citing of this 1888 edition is misleading because of the
implication that the status of the tort has not changed. Even
the 1932 fourth edition of Cooley on Torts3 4 shows the trend of
cases changing in favor of allowing recovery for the tort.
The harshness of the Louisiana position was demonstrated by
the decision of Templeton v. Interstate Electric Co.3 5 The plain-
tiff owned a franchise with the defendant companies and was
seeking to liquidate his account with them. With their assurance
31. 193 La. 234, 190 So. 390 (1939). In this case the plaintiff had con-
tracted with a bank for the advancement of certain sums of money. The
defendant, president of the bank, advised the bank to breach its contract
with the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed a cause of action against the defen-
dant under article 2324 (one who assists or encourages another person to
do an unlawful act is answerable in solido with the wrongdoer). The court
held if there ever was such a right of action, it was in tort and therefore
was barred by one year prescription (article 3536). Under the common law
principles of this tort, the president of a bank would be privileged to give
advice to the bank unless motivated by some ill will toward the plaintiff.
Fiduciaries because of their position, are privileged to give such advice.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (1968).
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324: "He who causes another person to do an un-
lawful act, or assists or encourages in the commission of it, is answerable,
in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act."
33. 200 La. 515, 8 So.2d 361 (1942). The factual situation in Cust involved
inducing breach of a contract which was terminable at will (with one
month's notice). American courts also would have denied recovery, but for
different reasons. The policy consideration advanced in dealing with such
contracts is that the inducer is not encouraging the breach of a legal duty,
but is merely influencing the exercise of a legal option-the termination of
the contract. If a party wishes to have greater security in his contractual
relations he should enter into a contract which is not terminable at the will
of the other party.
34. "One who maliciously or without justifiable cause induces a person
to break his contract with another will be liable to the latter for the damages
resulting from such a breach . . . Malice is proved if it appears that the
defendant with knowledge of the contract, intentionally and without justifi-
cation induced one of the contracting parties to break it." 2 T. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 227 (4th ed. 1932).
35. 214 La. 334, 37 So.2d 809 (1948).
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that approval of a transfer was a mere formality, the plaintiff
entered into a contract to sell the franchise to another. Later the
defendant companies refused approval of the transfer unless
the plaintiff paid up his account. The defendant companies, by
offering an independent franchise, induced the purchaser to
breach his sales contract with the plaintiff. The supreme court
recognized that the plaintiff was attempting to liquidate his ac-
count by the sale36 and that the defendants were insincere in their
refusal to approve the transfer.37 But the court was tied to the
"well settled" law of Louisiana (citing Cust) and denied re-
covery against the defendants.
In not deterring such unjustified conduct by the defendant,
the difficulty of the Kline doctrine becomes apparent. If the
defendants were in fear of liability for inducing breach of con-
tract, approval of the transfer would have been very probable.
This would have permitted the plaintiff to sell his franchise
and to liquidate his account. The purchaser would have acquired
his franchise from the plaintiff and there would have been no
litigation between the parties. Such a result is surely desirable.
Since 1948 the Louisiana Supreme Court has not been called
upon to deal directly with the tort of inducng breach of con-
tract.38 The tort was a minor issue in New Orleans Opera Guild
v. Local 174, Musician Mut. Protective Union 9 in 1961. The
predominant issue was whether a labor union's use of an "un-
fair list" against an employer (plaintiff) was an unfair labor
practice under state statutes. The plaintiff had also alleged that
the union should be liable for inducing breach of contract. It
was decided that the union's conduct was privileged under the
circumstances. A determination that the conduct was privileged
should have precluded any recovery for inducing breach of con-
36. "[T~he plaintiff, instead of receiving the cooperation he was so
earnestly seeking, was being met with every manner of coercion that an
official of the company could exert ...." Templeton v. Interstate Elec. Co.,
214 La. 334, 342, 37 So.2d 809, 812 (1948).
37. "This clearly shows the insincerity of the companies . . . since by
their very action the most expeditious liquidation of this account was being
thwarted by them." Templeton v. Interstate Elec. Co., 214 La. 334, 343,
37 So.2d 809, 812 (1948).
38. There have been numerous appellate court decisions denying a cause
of action but all of them rely strictly on Cust. See Roussel Pump & Electric
Co. v. Sanderson, 216 So.2d 650 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Delta Finance Co.
of Louisiana v. Graves, 180 So.2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); Franzella Realty,
Inc. v. Kolb, 152 So.2d 837 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Hale v. Gaienne, 102
So.2d 324 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958).
39. 242 La. 134, 134 So.2d 901 (1961).
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tract.40 But the majority opinion proceeded to briefly mention
the tort and concluded that it was not per se actionable in Lou-
isiana (citing Cust).
Examination of the jurisprudence indicates why Louisiana
maintains the position that inducing breach of contract is not
actionable unless unlawful means are used. First, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has not reevaluated the tort since the Temple-
ton decision in 1948. Second, the foundation of the Louisiana
jurisprudence is Kline v. Eubanks, a decision which relies upon
an undue limitation of article 2315, giving great weight to the
law of other jurisdictions which have subsequently changed and
the second edition of Cooley on Torts which has been updated
and changed in the fourth edition.
Fault in Inducing Breach of Contract
The general law of torts in Louisiana is based on the con-
cept of fault in article 2315. This concept is primarily concerned
with the question of what type of conduct is wrongful under a
given factual situation. Louisiana courts have been reluctant to
equate this concept of fault with common law tort principles.41
Louisiana civil law traditions prevent extensive reference to
common law principles in many areas of law (e.g., successions
and property), but in the law of torts human conduct is at issue.
The standards of human conduct acceptable to the American
public, while not rigidly uniform, are much the same throughout
this country. Therefore, justification certainly exists for Louisi-
ana courts to examine and consider the development of the tort
in other American jurisdictions.
In determining what standard of conduct is to apply in tort
cases, Louisiana courts have made some reference to principles
which are unanimously accepted by the common law jurisdic-
tions. 42 Louisiana courts should give weight to such common
law tort principles without the necessity of integrating all com-
mon law torts into our civilian concept of fault. This may be
done by examining the concept of fault and its relations to con-
40. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 123 (3d ed. 1964).
41. Daggett, Dainow, Hebert & McMahon, The Civil Law in Louisiana,
12 TUL. L. REV. 12, 33 (1937).
42. See Boudreaux v. All-State Finance Corp., 217 So.2d 439 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1968). The court, recognizing the right to recovery of damages for the
Intentional infliction of emotional disturbance, referred to RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1968).
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tract rights to determine whether inducing breach of contract
constitutes "fault" under article 2315.
Article 2315, like its French equivalent,48 provides for a con-
cept of fault which escapes any precise definition. The French
commentators have attempted to define "fault" under the French
Code. Toullier states that one is at fault when he does that which
he has no right to do.44 Planiol and Ripert write of fault in terms
of one not doing that which he ought to do.45 These definitions
do not define what conduct constitutes fault. Changes in social
and legal standards prevent a fixed concept of what one has a
right to do or what one ought not to do. Fault must be a dynamic
concept not limited to a certain time or system of values,46
because new circumstances develop which result in new stan-
dards of conduct. The Kline decision, by limiting the application
of fault to problems known at the inception of the article, has
placed an undue restriction on this principle of law.
Establishing that fault is a dynamic concept does not neces-
sarily mean that inducing breach of contract is actionable. It
must be determined what relationship "contract rights" have to
the concept of fault. The underlying policy of the Civil Code
provisions on obligations is to provide security of contract by
establishing a legal relationship between the contracting parties
which can be the basis of a remedy against a defaulting party.
Civil Code article 1756 provides that obligation is synonymous
with duty, while article 1757 places in the obligee a right to
enforce the obligor's performance by law. When an obligor en-
ters into a valid contract, a legal duty to perform arises, and any
violation or breach of this duty gives the obligee an action in
damages or specific performance. But the obligor has no legal
option to perform or pay damages.
43. FRENCH Civ. CODE art. 1382 (Wright's transl. 1908): "Any person who
causes injury to another by any act whatsoever is obligated to compensate
such other person for the injury sustained."
44. XI TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAls no 119-120 (4th ed. 1824) cited in
Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana, 17 TUL. L. REV. 159, 204 (1942).
45. VI PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITn PRATIQUE Dr DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIs no 477
(1930), cited in Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana, 17 TUL. L. REV. 159, 205
(1942).
46. "Louisiana, with her heritage of civilian doctrine in a broad prin-
ciple of tort liability of which 2315 . . . is a great example, is possessed of a
system of liability at once simple and coherent which is broad enough to
encompass the changing behavior pattern of the people and developing social
and legal notions of wrongful conduct." Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana
16 TUL. L. REV. 489, 511 (1942).
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The defaulting obligor may be forced to pay damages in
lieu of performance, but when this occurs there has been a
breach of his legal duty to perform. Any third party inducement
to breach a contract is not aimed at the obligor's exercise of a
legal option, but is meant to cause the breach of a legal duty
owed to the obligee. Our Civil Code, by establishing a legal
duty to perform and a legal right to specific performance, has
placed even greater emphasis on security of contract than com-
mon law jurisdictions. Some American authorities 47 recognize
payment of damages as an acceptable alternative to performance.
The Louisiana Civil Code indicates a policy of greater contract
security by favoring specific performance to payment of dam-
ages. Conduct which undermines this policy should be consid-
ered tortious.
The obligee has a dual "interest" in his contract. His interest
with respect to the obligor is to receive performance of the con-
tract. This performance is secured by contract law. The obligee
in relation to third persons also has an interest in having this
contract right which he has against the obligor free from out-
side interference.48 Tort law secures this interest in relation to
third persons, and one who invades the obligee's interest by
inducing a breach of contract should be subject to liability.
In the nineteenth century this latter interest of an obligee
was protected only from third party invasions in which unlaw-
ful means were used. But in the twentieth century the need for
security of contract in business and commercial relations re-
quires that this interest be given greater protection from third
party invasions.49 Contracting parties in order to perform their
commitments may have to enter into contracts with other par-
ties. The default by one contracting party may cause repercus-
sions in an entire network of commercial relations. These new
circumstances result in a new standard of conduct-an obligee's
interest in his contract should be given greater protection than
the interfering party's freedom of action. By applying a dynamic
concept of fault to these new circumstances, Louisiana can and
should make inducing breach of contract a tort under article
47. Bee Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897).
48. Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728,
732 (1928).
49. Downey v. United Weather-Proofing, Inc., 363 Mo. 852, 253 S.W.2d
976 (1953). See note 4 supra.
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2315 without equating this article to all common law tort doc-
trines.
Effects on Civilian Doctrine
Two aspects of our civil law doctrines must be examined
before inducing breach of contract is considered as fault. The
first is the personal nature of a contract, and the second involves
the difference between civil law and common law measures of
recovery for breach of contract.
A cause of action for inducing breach of contract does not
destroy the personal nature of a contract under civilian con-
cepts. The over-all similarity of the French and Louisiana Codes
would produce similar problems in the acceptance of this tort.
Both Codes contain articles indicating the personal nature of a
contract and articles providing for a concept of fault.5 0 French
Civil Code article 1165 provides that contracts are to have effect
only between the contracting parties and do not affect third per-
sons. Louisiana Civil Code articles 1901 and 199751 imply this
same limitation. Both Codes seem to contain what can be called
an apparent conflict between the personal nature of a contract
and tort law subjecting to liability one who interferes with that
contract.
The French, in allowing recovery for interference with con-
tractual relations, 52 have found no conflict between French Civil
Code articles 1165 and 1382 because each has its own dominion
of application.5 3 Although a contract is binding only on its
parties and does not affect third persons, there should be no
inference that third persons have a right to interfere with the
obligee's interest in the performance of the legal duty owed by
the obligor. 54 Such an interference would be actionable under
50. Cf. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1382; LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.
51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901: "Agreements legally entered into have the
effect of laws on those who have formed them .... " LA. CIv. CODE art. 1997:
"An obligation is strictly personal when none but the obligee can enforce
the performance."
52. 27 mai. 1908 D.P., 1908.1.459, S. 1910.1.118; Paris, 24 nov. 1904, S.
1905.2.284; Req. 3 mai. 1920, S. 1921.1.158.
53. "Le conflit des articles 1165 et 1382 n'existe pas en r~alit6; & chacun
son domaine d'application." A. WEILL, LA RELATIVIThI DES CONVENTIONS EN DROIT
PRivA FRANgA1S 521 (1939).
54. Id. at 436; "L'articZe 1165 ne conf~re pas aux tiers le droit d'ignorer
1dgalement les conventions qui leur sont dtrangdres." (Article 1165 does not
confer upon third parties the right to legally ignore the contract to which
they are strangers) [transl. by authors).
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Toullier's concept of fault because the third party is doing some-
thing he has no right to do. It is the concept of fault, not the
law of obligations, which subjects the third person to liability;
therefore the personal nature of the contract is not affected.
The measure of contract recovery differs in civil law and
common law jurisdictions. Louisiana Civil Code article 1934(1)
makes a distinction between good faith and bad faith breach
of contract. Similar to a tort recovery, damages which are the
immediate and direct consequences of a bad faith breach are
allowed in a contract action against the breaching party. Since
such a breach of contract under another's inducement is usually
in bad faith, the injured party has a contract remedy which is
similar to that of a tort action. In common law jurisdictions
contract remedy does not rest on a distinction between a good
or bad faith breach. In order to encourage entry into commercial
transactions, 55 the common law remedy for breach of contract is
limited to damages foreseeable when the contract was made.56
The injured party's recovery for other damages foreseeable at
the time of the breach is limited to possible actions against a
third party for inducing breach of contract.
In Louisiana the injured party may get full recovery in
contract; whereas limitations on contract remedy at common
law may force the party to resort to a tort action for full re-
covery. This observation should not lead one to the conclusion
that inducing breach of contract is a unique development of the
common law in response to inadequate contract remedy. Al-
though this limitation on contract recovery gave added reason to
the common law action for inducing breach of contract, this was
not the primary reason for the tort's development. The principal
reason is that the law's preference of performance to payment
justifies deterring third parties from interfering with contractual
relations.5"
The emphasis of this tort is on securing performance, not
payment of damages. In American jurisdictions the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases for inducing breach of contract involve
actions for injunctions or situations where the defaulting con-
55. Comment, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 967 (1964).
56. A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1007 (1964).
57. Comment, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 959 (1964).
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tract party is insolvent. 58 In such cases any limitation on con-
tract recovery is not the moving consideration in plaintiff's
decision to go against the third party inducer.
The tort of inducing breach of contract cannot be dismissed
as a unique common law phenomenon. This is evidenced by the
fact that civil law jurisdictions such as France and Belgium59
subject a third party to liability when he interferes with a con-
tract. The French jurisprudence requires only simple knowledge
of a contract by the third party.30 French courts evidently go
further than most common law courts which require knowledge
plus some affirmative act amounting to inducement. The French
position has not been examined in order to advocate its accep-
tance. Reference to French law has been limited to two pur-
poses. First, the French position demonstrates that there are
no inherent civilian concepts which make it difficult to fully
accept this tort. Second, the French concern for security of con-
tract evidences the fact that inducing breach of contract is not
a unique common law phenomenon.
Conclusion
The twentieth century development of business and com-
mercial relations has caused common law and civil law juris-
dictions to recognize a cause of action for inducing breach of
contract, thereby affording greater security to contracts. Lou-
isiana has severely limited recovery in this area by requiring
that means used by the defendant be unlawful in themselves.
This position unduly limits the application of article 2315 and
relies on the decisions of other jurisdictions which have subse-
quently been reversed.
By applying a dynamic concept of fault to the needs of
58. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 123 (3d ed. 1964);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. draft § 774A(1) (1968).
59. In Belgium contractual relations are protected by the civil law-a
person who knowingly participates in the violation of a contractual engage-
ment undertaken with one of his competitors and profits thereby has com-
mitted a fault, H. PINNER, WORLD UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 450 (1965).
60. A. WEILL, LA RELATIVITA DES CONVENTIONS EN DROIT PRIVIL FRANgAIS § 254
(1939): "Le tiers peut otre rendn responsable de la violation du contrat d~s
qu'il apparait en fait qu'il en a eu connaissance. Ii est donc inexact de
dire . . . que la jurisprudence . .. cherche toujours d ddcouvrir comme base
de la responsabilitd du tiers une fraude." (A third person can be held liable
for violation of a contract as soon as it appears that he did in fact have
knowledge of it. It is thus incorrect to say that the cases search to expose
as a base of liability of the third person a fraud.) [transl. by authors].
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modern business and commercial transactions, Louisiana should
make inducing breach of contract actionable under article 2315.
This tort can be introduced without equating this article to all
common law tort doctrines or impairing any civilian concepts.
In accord with the Civil Code's emphasis on performance, a
cause of action for inducing breach of contract will result in
greater security of contract in Louisiana.
Richard T. Simmons, Jr. and Pres Kabacoff
SALES-LESION BEYOND MOiETY-AcTIoN AGAINST
FIRST VENDEE AFTER RESALE TO THIRD PARTY
Plaintiff sold the timber on his property to defendant for
$12,800. Defendant resold the timber for $30,000 to a third party.
Plaintiff then filed suit against defendant for rescission of the sale,
subsequently amending his petition to include the third party
purchaser as a defendant. On a motion for summary judgment,
the suit against the third party purchaser was dismissed. The first
vendee and remaining defendant filed an exception urging no
cause of action which was primarily based on the ground that
since the ownership of the timber had passed into the hands of a
third party, the plea of lesion was no longer available to the ven-
dor. The district court sustained the exception and the court of
appeal affirmed.' The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the
judgment of the court of appeal, overruled the exception of no
cause of action, and remanded the case to the district court for
a trial on the merits. The court concluded that where immovable
property is sold for a lesionary consideration and the purchaser
subsequently resells the property, the original seller can recover
from the original purchaser the proceeds from the original pur-
chaser's sale to the third party. Or, in other words, the first ven-
dor can recover the difference between the price at which he sold
and the price which the vendee received when he subsequently
resold. O'Brien v. LeGette, 254 La. 252, 223 So.2d 165 (1969).
The Louisiana Civil Code defines lesion as "the injury suffered
by one who does not receive a full equivalent for what he gives in
a commutative contract. '2 It further specifies that when a vendor
of an immovable has received less than one-half the value of the
estate sold by him, lesion beyond moiety has occurred and the
1. O'Brien v. LeGette, 211 So.2d 427 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
2. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1860.
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